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territory from the assertion of the Declaration of Independence that the United States have full power to do all things which independent states may do. This of course includes the power possessed by other states to acquire and govern colonies, and in this, as in all other respects, the United States must be the peer of any. He further argues that the power, originally derived from the Declaration of Independence, is confirmed by the provision of the tenth amendment to the Constitution reserving to the people the powers not delegated to the United States. The power to acquire territory, not having been delegated to the United States by the Constitution, is therefore "reserved to the people, and is to be exercised by them as their other legislative and executive powers are exercised, through the general government" (p. 106). As to the precise mode of exercise, the author is not clear. Texas, he says, should have been acquired by treaty, if at all, but, although devoting the longest chapter in the book to the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, he does not suggest that there is any question of the constitutionality of acquiring by joint resolution territory which is neither admitted nor intended ever to be admitted as a state.

The author's ideas of national rights and obligations are hardly less confused than his opinions upon constitutional law. In the preface he says that the story of expansion is "not all pride and sunshine. The nation has not always acted wisely and well. There are things to condemn as well as to commend. Acts are not always necessarily right just because our own country performs them." In the body of the book, however, every aggressive step, except the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War, is accorded unqualified approval. He claims that we exercised a protectorate over Cuba in the interest of Spain which rendered us responsible for the peace of this island; that withdrawal from the Philippines would have been a "course . . . worthy only of a pirate"; that we have a natural right to seize the Isthmus, should transit be unreasonably or arbitrarily denied; that we have a "reversionary right" to the West Indies, and that we must stand ready to take for ourselves whatever we are unwilling that others should acquire. This is the doctrine of the Ostend Manifesto, denounced by the first Republican platform (1856) as "the highwayman's plea, that 'might makes right.'" Its enunciation and popularity disclose the extent to which war blunts the moral sense of a people.

F. H. HODDER.

Historic Highways of America. By ARCHER BUTLER HULBERT. Vol. VIII., Military Roads of the Mississippi Basin. The Conquest of the Old Northwest. Vol. X., The Cumberland Road. Vol. XI., Pioneer Roads and Experiences of Travelers. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company. 1904. Pp. 237, 208, 201.)

In his series upon historic highways in the northeastern and north central portions of the United States, Mr. Hulbert includes a study, un-

der the head of military roads, of the route used by Clark in the "Illinois country", of those employed by St. Clair and by Wayne in their several expeditions into the present state of Ohio, and of those chosen by Har-mar, Hardin, and others on their minor Indian campaigns into the same region about 1790. The title seems rather large for a study confined geographically to a space three or four hundred miles long and covering chronologically less than twenty-five years. Of the routes taken by these expeditions, only that of Clark is in any degree uncertain. The author has made a special study of the several possible routes from Fort Massac to Kaskaskia and from Kaskaskia to Vincennes and has marked his conclusions on a map. He differs in many particulars from Draper (MSS. in Wisconsin Historical Society library) and from William H. English (*Conquest of the Northwest*). The descriptions of the other campaigns and their routes, although well-written, offer little that is novel.

The sketch of the Cumberland National Road, which forms a number, has been touched upon frequently in preceding volumes of this series. The author here presents a revised reprint of his contribution on this subject to the publications of the Ohio Archeological and Historical Society several years since. From the standard of the picturesque and the realistic, this is the best monograph yet written on this important public work. Drovers, wagoners, stage-drivers, and tavern-keepers here find proper places. An appendix itemizes the \$6,824,919.33 appropriated by the national government to build this connecting link between the east and the west. One wishes the writer had dwelt more upon the Union-making influence of the road and its loosening effect upon the bonds of strict construction; but this treatment might not be appropriate to a popular writing. The author closes the volume with a vision of the old highway rejuvenated and repeopled by the coming generation of outdoor-living Americans.

The treatment of pioneer roads is designed to make a sub-series. The first volume, here presented, need not long detain the reader familiar with pioneer writings. Of its four chapters, one is taken from Francis Baily's *Journal* and another from Judge James Hall's well-known *Legends of the West*. A third chapter describes the "trace" made by Ebenezer Zane under government instruction in 1796. It extended from Wheeling, now West Virginia, to Limestone, Kentucky, traversing the present state of Ohio in a southwesterly direction. Over it the mail was carried from the Braddock Road to Kentucky. Here the author departs from the apparent chronology which has for the most part marked the series, to treat of President Jackson's veto of the Maysville Road bill in 1830. He considers the Maysville Road as the natural extension of the Zane Trace. It is true that mail was carried over the one as supplementary to the other. But it is not certain that the promoters of the Maysville Road as a link in the great western highway to New Orleans in 1830 would have advocated the Zane Trace in Ohio as another link. The fourth chapter in this volume is a very readable description of the evolution of the public road from trail to turnpike. Much of the testimony is taken from

contemporary travelers, who bear uniform witness to the hardships of journeys in the olden time.

EDWIN E. SPARKS.

Napoleon, a Short Biography. By R. M. JOHNSTON. (New York : A. S. Barnes and Company. 1904. Pp. xv, 248.)

THIS is "a lightning portrait" of the poor Corsican who one hundred years ago by the force of his intellect and character, aided by conditions which furnished him an opportunity, made himself emperor of the French. The author does not pretend that it is anything more. In the immense mass of literature relating to the Napoleonic period, "probably approaching forty thousand books", it is easy for the student of even a limited part of the tremendous story to lose his way. To retain a proper perspective of the whole picture, to keep the main facts of the troublous twenty years crisply in view, may lead him more than once to resort to such a volume. Details else might drown him. In this sense the book is useful and well-balanced, although, because it is a mere sketch, some lines of the portrait are purposely drawn with a stronger hand than would be permissible in a finished portrait. The pages contain more about the politics of Europe and the affairs of state of France than they do of the wonderful military exploits which made it possible for Napoleon to rise. Some of each are more fully treated than others. To the eighteenth Brumaire, the Code Napoleon, the Cadoudal plot, and the execution of the Duke d'Enghien, considerable space is given, as if in the author's eye these were the character lines of the face. The military side is of necessity wanting, although to the civilian reader the general idea of the campaigns is pointed out. As is perhaps natural, and as English-speaking peoples demand, the closing drama of Waterloo is afforded much space. Yet it was not Waterloo which lost Napoleon his throne. Had he won the battle of Waterloo, he must have been later defeated in the same year. Regarded from the military standpoint, the battle of Waterloo, to which twelve pages are given, is of less interest and showed far less ability than the operations south of Ratisbon in 1809, to which six lines are devoted. Writing for the audience he does, the author is no doubt justified in thus finishing his croquis with a bold black stroke, for few people care to study Napoleon's campaigns intimately. To one who has patiently assimilated the 22,067 official documents, plus the St. Helena papers, in the *Correspondence of Napoleon*, the portrait must necessarily appear crude; but within the compass of 250 small pages, it is doubtful whether more could be done.

As a soldier Napoleon committed fewer mistakes and did finer work than any other man of modern times. As a statesman his great mistake was not to see that whatever plan of conquest he might by military force accomplish would eventually be wrecked by the aspirations of all countries speaking the same language to remain one. Yet he could not refrain from playing with the states of Europe as if they were a pack of